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LIST OF ALL PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING 
Plaintiff7Appellant, Laina Roundy ("Roundy"). 
Defendant/Appellee, Travis Staley ("Staley"). 
Thor B. Roundy and Anastasia Roundy, the husband and daughter of Laina 
Roundy, were original parties to this action. Their claims, which were based upon the theory of 
loss of consortium, were summarily dismissed. Neil Staley, Travis Staley's father, was also 
initially a defendant to the action. Roundy's claims against Neil Staley, which were based upon 
a theory of negligent entrustment, were also summarily dismissed. The trial court's orders 
regarding the dismissal of these parties are not before this Court on appeal. 
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This matter is an appeal from a final judgment and order of the Third Judicial 
District Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah The Judgment reflecting the jury verdict was 
entered on July 11,1997 The Order Denying Roundy's Motion for New Trial was entered on 
November 4, 1997 The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Rule 
42(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure and Utah Code Annotated § 78-2(a)-3(2)Q) The 
Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 
§ 78-2-20) 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the District Court properly allow Staley to present surveillance video 
evidence of Roundy at trial in order to rebut Roundy's credibility and testimony regarding the 
extent of her injuries? 
In reviewing questions of the admissibility of evidence that do not involve the 
balancing of specified factors this Court employs a correctness standard. Cal Wadsworth Const. 
v. City of St. George, 898 P.2d 1372 (Utah 1995); UtahDept. of Trans, v. 6200 South Asso., 872 
P.2d 462 (Ut. Ct. App. 1994); Turner v. General Adjustment Bureau, Inc., 832 P.2d 62 (Ut. Ct. 
App. 1992). 
2. Did the District Court commit reversible error by denying Roundy's 
Motion for New Trial based upon Rule 59(a)(3) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure which 
provides that a district court "may" grant a new trial on the basis of "[a]ccident or surprise, 
which ordinary prudence could not have guarded against," because the District Court allowed 
Staley to present surveillance video evidence of Roundy to rebut her credibility and testimony 
regarding the extent of her injuries? 
The granting or refusal to grant a new trial is a matter of broad discretion of the 
trial court. Haslam v. Paulsen, 389 P.2d 736 (Utah 1964); Page v. Utah Home Fire Ins. Co., 391 
P.2d 290 (Utah 1964). Thus, the trial court's decision will be reversed on appeal only for an 
abuse of discretion. Smith v. Shreeve, 551 P.2d 1261 (Utah 1976); Scmidtv. Intermountain 
Health Care, Inc., 635 P.2d 99 (Utah 1981). 
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3. Did the District Court commit reversible error by denying Roundy's 
Motion for New Trial based upon Rule 59(a)(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure which 
provides that a district court "may" grant a new trial on the basis of "irregularity in the 
proceedings" and because the District Court allowed Staley to present surveillance video 
evidence of Roundy to rebut her credibility and testimony regarding the extent of her injuries? 
The trial court's decision to refuse to grant a new trial will be reversed on appeal 
only for an abuse of discretion. Smith v. Shreeve, 551 P.2d 1261 (Utah 1976); Scmidt v. 
Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 635 P.2d 99 (Utah 1981). 
4. Did the District Court commit reversible error by denying Roundy's 
Motion for New Trial based upon Rule 59(a)(7) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure which 
provides that a District Court "may" grant a new trial on the basis of "error in the law," because 
the District Court allowed Staley to present surveillance video evidence of Roundy to rebut her 
credibility and testimony regarding the extent of her injuries? 
The trial court's decision to refuse to grant a new trial will be reversed on appeal 
only for an abuse of discretion. Smith v. Shreeve, 551 P.2d 1261 (Utah 1976); Scmidt v. 
Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 635 P.2d 99 (Utah 1981). 
5. Did the District Court commit reversible error in granting Staley's Motion 
for Directed Verdict on Roundy's cause of action for punitive damages? 
Reversal of a trial court's grant of directed verdict is required only if reasonable 
men could arrive at a different conclusion. Rhiness v. Dansie, All P.2d 428 (Utah 1970); 
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Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 817 P.2d 789 (Utah 1991); Onyeabor v. Pro Roofing, Inc., 787 P.2d 
525 (Ut. Ct. App. 1990). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This action arises from an automobile accident that occurred on May 18, 1994 in 
Salt Lake County, Utah. The accident took place at the intersection of Redwood Road and the 
1-80 on/off ramp. (Tr. of May 13, 1997 proceedings at 30.) Just prior to the accident Staley's 
vehicle approached the intersection traveling northbound on Redwood Road. (Tr. of May 14, 
1997 proceedings at 78.) Roundy's vehicle was traveling southbound on Redwood Road. (Tr. 
of May 13, 1997 proceedings at 31-32.) The accident occurred as Roundy made a left turn 
through the intersection on to the 1-80 on ramp across the path of Staley's vehicle. (Tr. of 
may 13 1997 proceedings at 34.) Of primary dispute at trial was the color of the traffic signal 
governing the intersection at the time that Roundy made her left turn, and at the time that Staley 
entered the intersection. As a result of the accident Roundy claims to have sustained cervical 
soft tissue injuries. She also complained of injuries to her head, arm, back and chest. (Tr. of 
May 13, 1997 proceedings at 57-62.) 
On October 19, 1994 Roundy submitted Plaintiffs' First Set of Interrogatories, 
Requests for Production of Documents and Things and Requests for Admissions to Defendants 
("written discovery requests"). (Addendum to Roundy's Opening Brief.) Roundy's written 
discovery requests, and Staley's responses thereto include the following: 
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INTERROGATORY NO. 2: Identify all witnesses you intend to 
call on your behalf at trial in this matter. Include in your answer a 
brief summary of their proposed testimony. 
ANSWER: OBJECTION. Discovery is on-going and counsel for 
defendant has not yet made decisions about which witnesses may 
be called at trial. Counsel for defendant will comply with the 
court's order for designating witnesses at the time designated by 
the court. Without waiving that objection, it is anticipated at this 
time that defense counsel will call: plaintiffs, defendants Neil 
Staley and Travis Staley, Melodie Kraft, Officer Hawk, Maryann 
Jiminez, expert witnesses as yet undetermined and undoubtedly 
others. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 3: Identify all individuals who may 
have information concerning the allegations of Plaintiffs 
Complaint and Defendant's Answer. Include in your answer a 
brief summary of the information which they may have. 
ANSWER: Plaintiff would best know who has information about 
their Complaint. As to defendants' Answer, Objection: The 
answer was prepared by counsel, and is the product of counsel's 
mental impressions and legal analysis; as such the information 
requested is protected as work product pursuant to Utah Rule of 
Civil Procedure 26(b)(3). As to the general subject matter of this 
litigation, plaintiffs, defendants Neil Staley and Travis Staley, 
Officer Hawk, Melodie Kraft, Maryann Jiminez, plaintiffs treating 
physicians and undoubtedly others. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 4: Identify all individuals you plan to 
use as expert witnesses at trial in this matter. Include in your 
answer a copy of their resume or curriculum vitae, and a brief 
summary of their proposed testimony. 
ANSWER: OBJECTION. Discovery is on-going and counsel for 
defendant has not yet made decisions about expert witnesses that 
may be called at trial. Counsel for defendant will comply with the 
court's order for designating witnesses at the time designated by 
the court. Without waiving that objection, it is anticipated at this 
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time that defense counsel will call an accident ^constructionist, 
one or more medical experts, who are undetermined at this time, 
and one or more medical experts who will perform Independent 
Medical Examinations; other experts may likely be called as well. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 6: Identify all documents (in the detail 
required by "Definitions" paragraph 5, above) you intend to use on 
your behalf at trial in this matter. 
ANSWER: OBJECTION. This discovery is on-going and counsel 
for defendant has not yet made decisions about which exhibits may 
be used at trial. Counsel for defendant will comply with the 
court's order for providing exhibits or exhibit lists at the time 
designated by the court. 
None of Roundy's interrogatories asked specifically if Staley had a surveillance 
video tape of Roundy or regarding the existence of surveillance evidence at all. None of 
Roundy's request for production of documents asked Staley to produce copies of the surveillance 
video tape or other surveillance evidence. Roundy never filed a motion to compel additional 
discovery sought pursuant to her First Set of Interrogatories, Request for Production of 
Documents and Things and Request for Admissions to Defendants. Id 
On September 25, 1996, Roundy submitted a Rule 26(e) Request for 
Supplementation. On November 13, 1996, Staley provided his responses thereto. (Addendum to 
Roundy's Opening Brief.) Roundy's supplemental written discovery requests and Staley's 
responses thereto include the following: 
INTERROGATORY NO. 2: Identify all witnesses you intend to 
call on your behalf at trial on this matter. Include in your answer a 
brief summary of their proposed testimony. 
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ANSWER: Counsel for defendant has not yet made decisions 
about which witnesses may be called at trial. Counsel for 
defendant will comply with the court's order for designating 
witnesses at the time designated by the court. Without waiving 
that objection, it is anticipated at this time that defense will call: 
Laina Roundy, Travis Staley, Melodie Kraft, Officer Hawk, 
Maryann Jiminez, Anita Sanchez and undoubtedly others. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 4: Identify all individuals you plan to 
use as expert witnesses at trial in this matter. Include in your 
answer a copy of their resume or curriculum vitae, and a brief 
summary of their proposed testimony. 
ANSWER. OBJECTION. Discovery is on-going and counsel for 
defendant has not made decisions about expert witnesses that may 
be called at trial. Counsel for defendant will comply with the 
court's order for designating witnesses at the time designated by 
the court. Without waiving that objection, it is anticipated at this 
time that defense counsel will call Ronald L. Probert, accident 
^constructionist, Gerald Moress, M.D., and other experts may 
likely be called as well. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 6: Identify all documents (in the detail 
required by "Definitions" paragraph 5 above) you intend to use on 
your behalf at trial on this matter. 
ANSWER: Discovery is on-going and counsel for defendant has 
not yet made decisions about which exhibits may be used at trial. 
Counsel for defendant will comply with the court's order for 
providing exhibits or exhibit lists at the time designated by the 
court. Without waiving that objection, defendant may use the 
following exhibits at trial: a diagram of the accident scene 
involved in the subject accident; defendant may use a computer 
animation/recreation of the subject accident; photographs of the 
accident scene; portions of plaintiff s medical records and medical 
expenses, including extracts and summaries of such; copies, 
redacted as necessary, of the investigating officers' reports, 
diagrams and statements; Photographs of the defendant's vehicle; 
Photographs of the plaintiffs vehicle; Repair Records of the 
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parties' vehicles; Income, benefits and employment records of 
plaintiff, including extracts and summaries of such; IME reports; 
Expert's reports; Defendant reserves the right to submit additional 
exhibits obtained from materials in conjunction with formal 
discovery in this matter; Defendant reserves the right to submit 
additional exhibits as needed for rebuttal of plaintiffs claims; 
Defendant reserves the right to submit additional exhibits prepared 
from the date of this Supplemental Answer to Interrogatories and 
the date of trial. 
None of Roundy's supplemental written discovery requests specifically asked 
Staley to identify or provide surveillance evidence. Once again, Roundy did not submit a motion 
to compel discovery responses from Staley for which she was dissatisfied. Id, 
The trial court did not order a deadline for the parties to designate fact or expert 
witnesses. The trial court did not impose a deadline for the parties to designate trial exhibits. 
(Scheduling Order, Addendum.) 
During the first day of trial, counsel for Staley identified Mr. Ronald Gunderson 
("Gunderson") as a "possible" rebuttal witness that might be called during trial. (Tr. of May 9, 
1997 proceedings at 13.) Gunderson is a private investigator who obtained surveillance video 
tape evidence of Roundy that was probative as to her damage claims. (Tr. of May 14, 1997 
proceedings at 218.) Specifically, the surveillance video tape shows Roundy engaged in 
physical activities that contradict her claims of physical injuries and physical limitations. (Tr. of 
May 14, 1997 proceedings at 22.) Gunderson was ultimately called as a rebuttal witness to lay 
foundation for the video tape. (Tr. of May 14, 1997 proceedings at 218-223.) The surveillance 
video tape was also shown to Dr. Gerald Moress who had performed an independent medical 
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examination of Roundy. (Tr. of May 14, 1997 proceedings at 22.) Based upon his review of the 
videotape, and his examination of Roundy, Dr. Moress concluded that Roundy's physical 
injuries and limitations were not as severe as Roundy had indicated during his meeting with her. 
Id. 
Roundy presented evidence in support her case during three days of the four-day 
trial. As Roundy notes, the overwhelming evidence presented established that the traffic signal 
was green or yellow for Staley as he entered the intersection where the accident took place. 
(Roundy's Opening Brief at 8-9.) As a result, Roundy had an obligation to yield to Staley. 
(Utah Code Ann. section 41-6-73). After the presentation of Roundy's case, Staley moved for a 
directed verdict on Roundy's claim for punitive damages. (Tr. of May 14, 1997 proceedings at 
91-92.) The trial court granted the motion. (Tr. of May 14, 1997 proceedings at 95-96.) At the 
conclusion of trial, the jury determined that Roundy was 60% at fault for the accident. 
(Judgment, Addendum.) Because Roundy's fault exceeded that of Staley's, the jury did not 
address the issue of damages. Id. Judgment was entered on July 11, 1997. Id. Roundy 
subsequently filed her Motion for New Trial which was denied by the trial court on November 4, 
1997. (Order on Plaintiffs Motion for New Trial, Addendum.) 
Roundy has filed this appeal on the basis that even though she did not inquire 
regarding the existence of a surveillance video tape or surveillance evidence in her initial and 
supplemental written discovery requests, and even though she did not file a motion to compel 
additional discovery from Staley for those discovery responses that she now asserts were 
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inadequate, the trial court erred by admitting the surveillance video tape evidence and the related 
foundational testimony from Gunderson. Roundy also asserts on appeal that the trial court erred 
by granting Staley's motion for directed verdict on Roundy's claim for punitive damages. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. The trial court properly allowed Staley to present surveillance video 
evidence of Roundy at trial because Roundy never sought discovery of the video tape or any 
other type of surveillance evidence through available discovery methods. Furthermore, the trial 
court properly allowed Gunderson testify as a "rebuttal" witness to lay foundation for the 
surveillance video tape. 
2. The trial court properly denied Roundy's Motion for New Trial, which 
was based on Roundy's assertion that admission of the surveillance video evidence was an 
"accident or surprise which ordinary prudence could not have guarded against." Roundy could 
have guarded against admission of the surveillance evidence had she testified candidly regarding 
her physical injuries and damages. Moreover, Roundy could have guarded against the video 
surveillance evidence by using available discovery methods to learn of its existence. 
3. The trial court properly denied Roundy's Motion for New Trial, which 
was based on Roundy's assertion that "irregularity in the proceedings" occurred. Roundy fails to 
identify any "irregularity in the proceedings" or to provide legal support for her assertion that the 
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admission of surveillance evidence, that is not requested in discovery, should be considered 
"irregularity in the proceedings." 
4. The trial court properly denied Roundy's Motion for New Trial, which 
was based on Roundy's assertion that "error in the law" occurred in this case. Roundy fails to 
provide legal support for her assertion that the admission of surveillance evidence, that is not 
requested in discovery, should be considered an "error in the law." Moreover, assuming that an 
error occurred with regard to the surveillance evidence which was used to rebut Roundy's lack 
of candor about her injuries, Roundy is not entitled to a new trial because this evidence 
addressed only the damages element of Roundy's case. The jury did not go beyond the liability 
element of Roundy's claims to reach the issue of damages in its deliberations. Thus, the "error," 
if any, was harmless. 
5. The trial court properly granted Staley's motion for directed verdict on 
Roundy's cause of action for punitive damages. The overwhelming evidence presented at trial 
was that Staley entered the intersection where the accident took place on a green or yellow light 
and that Roundy made an improper left turn across Staley's travel lane in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. section 41-6-73. Roundy also failed to establish that Staley was speeding or that he should 
be held to a higher standard of care than other drivers simply because he was driving a suburban 
at the time of the accident. As a result, Roundy was unable to establish her punitive damage 
claim by clear and convincing evidence. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY ALLOWED STALEY TO PRESENT 
SURVEILLANCE VIDEO EVIDENCE OF ROUNDY AT TRIAL. 
A. Staley had No Obligation to Produce the Surveillance Video Tape, Nor to Disclose 
its Existence Prior to Trial, Because Roundy Never Requested Surveillance 
Evidence in Discovery. 
A review of Roundy's relevant written discovery requests reveals that Roundy 
never asked Staley to produce the surveillance video tape or even about the existence of 
surveillance evidence. Moreover, after receiving Staley's responses to these written discovery 
requests Roundy never filed a motion to compel additional information about surveillance video 
tape evidence or about Staley's trial witnesses. Even though Roundy never asked for this 
information in discovery she asserts she was "ambushed" and "surprised" by surveillance video 
evidence that was presented by Staley at trial. Roundy also asserts that the trial court erred in 
refusing to protect Roundy from the effect of this surveillance video evidence which shows 
Roundy engaged in physical activities that contradict her testimony regarding the injuries and 
physical limitations that she claims resulted from the accident. 
In Feola v. Egan^ 1998 WL 666964 (Conn. Super. Ct.) the plaintiff made a similar 
argument. In Feola the plaintiff brought action for personal injuries that she claimed resulted 
from a motor vehicle accident. The trial court allowed the defendant to present surveillance 
video tape evidence during trial. On appeal, the plaintiff asserted that admission of the video 
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tape evidence was error because it had not been disclosed prior to trial. The court disagreed 
holding that because the plaintiff had not asked the defendant to reveal the existence of 
surveillance video tape evidence in any interrogatory or discovery proceeding, the defendant had 
no obligation to reveal its existence. 
Similarly, in Detiller v. Smith, 638 So.2d 445 (La. Ct. App. 1994), the court was 
asked to address whether the plaintiff was prejudiced and unfairly surprised by the admission of 
surveillance video tape evidence that was made of the plaintiff during the course of trial. The 
video shows the plaintiff on a trial lunch break during which she removes a cervical collar that 
she had worn in the courtroom. In the video the plaintiff turns her head from side to side and 
tilts her head back as she drinks a soft drink. This evidence directly contradicted the plaintiffs 
testimony that she was in constant pain and that her weakness was so great that the only things 
she could do for herself was feed herself and go to the bathroom. Id. at 448. The court held that 
because the plaintiff had not submitted specific discovery requests that sought to obtain, or even 
inquired regarding the existence of surveillance video tape evidence, the defendant had no duty 
to produce the video tape and the evidence was admissible at trial. 
Finally, in Kiss v. Jacob, 633 A.2d 544 (N.J. Ct. App. 1993), overruled on other 
grounds, 650 A.2d 336 (N.J. 1994), the court addressed the situation where the plaintiffs did not 
request surveillance evidence eventhough they knew of its existence. In Kiss the plaintiffs asked 
about the existence of surveillance photographs in their written discovery requests to the 
defendant. In his initial response, the defendant stated that no such evidence existed. The 
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defendant later supplemented his response to indicate that he had subsequently obtained 
surveillance evidence. Thereafter, the plaintiffs never requested the surveillance evidence which 
was admitted at trial. On appeal, the plaintiffs claimed they were unfairly surprised by the 
surveillance evidence and that the defendant had a discovery obligation to produce the 
surveillance evidence eventhough it had not been requested after it was disclosed to the 
plaintiffs. The court disagreed holding that absent a specific discovery request for the 
surveillance evidence, the defendant had no obligation to produce it. Id. at 547. 
In accordance with the holdings of these cases Staley had no obligation to provide 
Roundy surveillance video evidence because it was never requested by Roundy. Furthermore, if 
Roundy was dissatisfied with Staley's responses to her discovery requests Roundy5 s remedy 
would have been to file a motion to compel. Roundy did not file a motion to compel and did not 
take any action to discover whether there was surveillance evidence. Roundy cannot complain 
of unfair surprise when she did nothing to determine the existence of surveillance evidence 
through available discovery methods. 
The few cases cited by Roundy in her Opening Brief do not support her argument 
that Staley had a duty to produce the surveillance video tape when it was not specifically 
requested. In fact, only two of these cases involve surveillance video tape evidence. 
The first case, Dodson v. Persell, 390 So.2d 704 (Fla. 1980), actually supports 
Staley's assertions in this matter. In Dodson the plaintiff submitted specific interrogatories to 
"discover whether surveillance of the [plaintiff] had taken place, whether photographs or movies 
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were taken, and, if so, the time and place taken, the substance of what the films purported to 
show, and the qualifications of the photographer." The defendant objected to the request on the 
basis of the work product privilege and refused to produce the requested materials. The plaintiff 
then filed a motion to compel responses to these specific discovery requests, which was denied. 
Surveillance materials were presented at trial. On appeal the court held, "upon request a party 
must reveal the existence of any surveillance information he possesses whether or not it is 
intended to be presented at trial." (Emphasis added.) 
In the present case Roundy did not inquire regarding the existence of surveillance 
evidence or seek to obtain the surveillance video tape. Roundy did not seek to compel discovery 
from Staley as was done in Dodson. Moreover, as the Dodson court held, the surveillance video 
tape of Roundy was privileged work product until it was decided that it would be used at trial. 
{See also, Grossman v. Emergency Cesspool and Sewer Cleaners, Inc., 617 N.Y.S.2d 422 
(1994); Ranft v. Lyons, All N.W.2d 254 (Wis. Ct. App. 1991). This decision was not made until 
Roundy took the stand and testified inconsistent with her actual physical activities. Roundy 
cannot now complain that the trial court erred in allowing the admission of this evidence, nor can 
she complain that she was prejudiced by evidence of her own conduct that contradicts her 
testimony regarding her injuries and damages 
In the second case cited by Roundy, Lascano v. Vowell, 940 P.2d 977 (Colo. Ct. 
App. 1996), the parties were required by rule to submit disclosure certificates including "a 
description, attached copy, or photograph of any exhibit that he or she might offer at trial" at 
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least 90 days before trial. Supplementation was required by rule at least 80 days before trial. 
Defendant obtained a surveillance video tape of plaintiff and attempted to include it as an exhibit 
after the disclosure deadlines. The court would not allow the admission of the evidence because 
the defendant had failed to disclose it prior to the deadlines. 
In the present case there is no rule that required Staley to designate trial exhibits 
or witnesses by a particular deadline. The trial court did not impose a deadline for the disclosure 
of trial exhibits or trial witnesses. Roundy never requested information regarding surveillance 
evidence in her discovery requests. Roundy never submitted a motion to compel additional 
discovery from Staley for the responses in which she was dissatisfied. Roundy's own failure to 
use available discovery methods to obtain information regarding surveillance evidence does not 
support her assertions that she was "ambushed" and "surprised" by surveillance video evidence 
presented by Staley at trial. Accordingly, Staley had no obligation to disclose the existence of 
the surveillance video or to produce it to Roundy. 
B. Gunderson's Testimony and the Surveillance Video Tape Were Rebuttal Evidence. 
In Feola v. Egan, 1998 WL 666964 (Conn. Super. Ct), the Connecticut Superior 
Court upheld the trial court's admission of video surveillance evidence of the plaintiff that had 
not been disclosed prior to trial. The court also held that the trial court did not err in allowing a 
private investigator, who was not disclosed as a trial witness, to testify regarding the surveillance 
video tape, and about plaintiffs behavior that he observed that was not included on the video 
tape. Id. at 449. The court held the private investigator was a rebuttal fact witness. 
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Roundy cites Turner v. Nelson, 872 P.2d 1021 (Utah 1994), in support of her 
assertion that Gunderson, who prepared and testified regarding the surveillance video tape of 
Roundy, cannot be considered a rebuttal witness. In Turner the plaintiff attempted to call a 
witness to "rebut" evidence from the defendant that a stop sign was partially obstructed at an 
intersection where the automobile giving rise to the action occurred. The plaintiff asserted that 
this defense was a surprise and the witness she intended to call was a rebuttal witness. Id. at 
1023. On appeal the Utah Supreme Court held that the trial court had the discretion to order the 
parties to disclose all potential witnesses prior to trial, which it had done. The Court also held 
that the trial court "had all of the evidence before it and was in the best position to determine 
whether [plaintiff] could reasonably have anticipated the obstructed-sign testimony." The court 
held it would not reverse the trial court unless the plaintiff could demonstrate that the trial court 
had clearly abused its discretion and thereby affected the plaintiffs rights. Id. at 1023-1024. 
Because the trial court had ordered the parties to disclose all witnesses prior to trial and because 
plaintiff "knew or should have anticipated that [defendant] would claim the sign was 
obstructed,"1 the appellate court held it had properly precluded the plaintiff from calling the 
previously undisclosed witness. 
]The Court noted that the defendant had designated a "traffic design expert" witness and 
a fact witness to the accident who both testified that the stop sign at the intersection where the 
accident took place was obstructed. Id. at 1025. Thus, the plaintiff had prior notice of this 
defense. 
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In this case the trial court also had all of the evidence before it and was in the best 
position to determine whether Gunderson should have been allowed to testify as a rebuttal 
witness regarding his surveillance of Roundy. Furthermore, Staley did not know if Roundy 
would testify candidly regarding her injuries and physical limitations until she actually presented 
her testimony at trial. That is why when Gunderson was disclosed on the first day of trial, he 
was identified only as a "possible" witness. When Roundy failed to be forthright in her 
testimony counsel for Staley called Gunderson and presented the surveillance video tape 
evidence to rebut Roundy's testimony. 
Roundy also cites Perez-Perez v. Popular Leasing Rental, Inc., 993 F.2d 281 (1st 
Cir. 1993) and Smith v. FordMotor Co, 626 F.2d 784 (10th Cir. 1980), for the proposition that it 
is error for a trial court to allow a previously undisclosed witness to testify at trial. Neither of 
these cases involve surveillance video tape evidence. In Perez-Perez the court held it was 
improper for the trial court to allow the plaintiff to call a previously undisclosed medical expert 
witness to testify at trial regarding the defendant's eyesight. The court noted that this witness 
introduced, for the first time, a novel theory of liability in the case. Thus, the defendant had no 
time to review any records or conduct discovery regarding this theory. Id. at 286 -287. 
Likewise, in Smith v. FordMotor Co. the court held that the defendant was unfairly prejudiced 
because the trial court allowed the plaintiff to call a previously undisclosed medical expert 
witness at trial to present a completely new and unexpected liability theory. Id. at 797. 
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In the present case neither Gunderson nor the surveillance video tape introduced a 
new theory of liability to the case. They simply presented facts regarding Roundy's own 
behavior which was relevant to Roundy's damage claims. This evidence, which counters 
Roundy's trial testimony regarding the severity of her physical injuries and her damage claims, 
is the classic form of rebuttal evidence because it shows Roundy contradicting herself through 
her own actions. 
POINT n 
THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY DENIED ROUNDY'S MOTION FOR NEW 
TRIAL, WHICH WAS BASED ON HER ASSERTION THAT AN ACCIDENT OR 
SURPRISE OCCURRED WHICH ORDINARY PRUDENCE COULD NOT HAVE 
GUARDED AGAINST. 
Rule 59(a)(3) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a new trial 
"may" be granted on the basis of "accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence could not have 
guarded against." In Anderson v. Bradley, 590 P.2d 339 (Utah 1979), the Utah Supreme Court 
held that a surprise which could have been guarded against by the utilization of available 
discovery methods, such as a motion to compel, may not serve as grounds for a new trial under 
this provision. 
Roundy asserts that Staley's use of Gunderson and the surveillance video tape 
evidence was a surprise which ordinary prudence could not have guarded against and that she is 
therefore entitled to a new trial. Contrary to Roundy's assertion, Roundy could have guarded 
against the "surprise" of this evidence had she testified honestly and consistently regarding her 
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physical injuries and damages. She did not. Moreover, even if the Court considers the 
surveillance evidence a surprise, Roundy had an opportunity to guard against it using available 
discovery methods. Roundy could have inquired specifically regarding the existence of 
surveillance evidence. She did not. Roundy also could have submitted a motion to compel to 
inquire further about Staley's anticipated trial witnesses. She did not. Accordingly, the trial 
court properly denied Roundy's Motion for New Trial which was based on Rule 59(a)(3) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
POINT m 
THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY DENIED ROUNDY5 S MOTION FOR NEW 
TRIAL, WHICH WAS BASED ON HER ASSERTION THAT "IRREGULARITY IN 
THE PROCEEDINGS" OCCURRED. 
Roundy also asserts that she is entitled to a new trial pursuant to Rule 59(a)(1) of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. This rule states that a new trial "may" be granted if the court 
determines that there was "[i]rregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury or adverse party, or 
any order of the court, or abuse of discretion by which either party was prevented from having a 
fair trial." Roundy, however, fails to make even one reference to the record to support the 
allegation that "irregularities" occurred. Instead, Roundy vaguely refers to the record as a whole 
and concludes that the non-disclosure of the surveillance evidence was "most 'irregular'". 
(Roundy Opening Brief at 20.) Roundy also fails to provide legal support for her assertion that 
the admission of rebuttal surveillance evidence, that was not sought in discovery, should be 
considered an irregularity in the proceedings that entitles her to a new trial. Accordingly, the 
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trial court properly denied Roundy's Motion for new trial which was based on the unsupported 
assertion that an irregularity occurred that prevented her from having a fair trial. 
POINT IV 
THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY DENIED ROUNDY'S MOTION FOR 
NEW TRIAL, WHICH WAS BASED ON HER ASSERTION THAT "ERROR 
IN THE LAW" OCCURRED. 
Rule 59(a)(7) provides that the trial court "may" grant a new trial if it determines 
that an u[e]rror in the law" has occurred. The "error" to which Roundy refers is the trial court's 
admission of surveillance evidence. Roundy fails to provide legal support for her assertion that 
the admission of rebuttal surveillance evidence, that was not sought by Roundy in discovery is 
error in the law. 
Furthermore, Rule 59(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a new 
trial may be granted only if one of the several circumstances discussed by Rule 59 exists, and 
"subject to the provisions of Rule 61 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure." By Rule 61, even if 
an error has been committed, a new trial may not be granted if the error is harmless. The Utah 
Supreme Court has held that "an error is harmful only if the likelihood of a different outcome is 
sufficiently high as to undermine [the appellate court's] confidence in the verdict." Crookston v. 
Fire Ins. Exch., 817 P.2d 789, 796 (Utah 1991). 
InMcDougalv. McCammon, 455 S.E.2d 788 (W.V. 1995), the sole issue before 
the court on appeal was whether the trial court improperly admitted surveillance video evidence 
of one of the plaintiffs. The surveillance evidence was not disclosed to the plaintiffs prior to 
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trial, even though they had expressly requested such evidence in discovery. The Supreme Court 
of West Virginia characterized this evidence as contradiction or rebuttal in nature, and was 
therefore admissible to impeach the plaintiff. Id. at 795. The court also held that the defendant 
had violated discovery rules in failing to produce the surveillance video because it had been 
requested in discovery. However, the court held that the surveillance video evidence was 
relevant only to the issue of damages. Because the jury returned a verdict in favor of the 
defendant on the liability issue, and did not reach the issue of damages, the admission of the 
surveillance video tape was harmless error. The court stated, "[i]n conclusion, we hold that 
although the admission of the video tape may have been error, because the video tape in dispute 
did not affect the question of liability, its admission was not reversible error." Id. at 799. 
Assuming, arguendo, that an error was committed in this case with regard to the 
admission of surveillance evidence which was used to rebut Roundy's lack of candor about her 
injuries, Roundy is not entitled to a new trial because this evidence only addressed the damages 
element of Roundy's case. The jury did not go beyond the liability element of Roundy's claims 
to reach the issue of damages in its deliberations. Instead, it determined that Roundy was 60% at 
fault for the accident. Thus, the alleged error raised by Roundy was harmless and her assertion 
that the trial court committed reversible error in denying her Motion for New Trial is groundless. 
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POINT V 
THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY GRANTED STALEY5 S MOTION FOR 
DIRECTED VERDICT ON ROUNDY'S CAUSE OF ACTION FOR PUNITIVE 
DAMAGES, 
Punitive damages may be awarded only under limited circumstances as set forth 
by Utah Code Ann. Section 78-18-l(l)(a): 
Except as otherwise provided by statute, punitive damages may be 
awarded only if compensatory or general damages are awarded and 
it is established by clear and convincing evidence that the acts or 
omissions of the tortfeasor are the result of willful and malicious or 
intentionally fraudulent conduct, or conduct that manifests a 
knowing and reckless indifference toward, and disregard of, the 
rights of others. 
In Behrens v. Raleigh Hills Hosp., Inc., 675 P.2d 1179 (Utah 1983) the Utah 
Supreme Court cautioned that punitive damages should be awarded in the infrequent, 
exceptional case and that "[s]imple negligence will never suffice as a basis upon which punitive 
damages may be awarded." 
The basis for Roundy's punitive damage claim prior to trial was that it was 
reckless disregard for Staley to enter an intersection, driving a suburban, knowing the traffic 
signal had turned red. Roundy took three days of the four-day trial to present evidence in 
support of her assertion. She called numerous witnesses to support her claims. Contrary to 
Roundy's allegations, the evidence presented established that the traffic signal was green or 
yellow when Staley entered the intersection and that Staley was traveling within the speed limit. 
Even Roundy admits that she was the only witness of the many called at trial that testified 
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otherwise. (Roundy Opening Brief at 8-9.) Roundy also failed to establish that Staley should be 
held to a higher standard of care than other drivers simply because he was driving a suburban at 
the time of the accident. At the conclusion of her case the trial court directed verdict on 
Roundy's punitive damage claim because Roundy could not establish the evidence to support 
this claim by clear and convincing evidence. The trial court's determination on this claim was 
proper. Staley's operation of a vehicle of the size and weight of a van or pickup truck, into an 
intersection on a green or yellow traffic light, within the speed limit, cannot be considered 
unreasonable conduct or an extreme departure from ordinary care. This conclusion is also 
supported by the fact that the jury returned a verdict in favor of Staley on the issue of liability. 
Accordingly, the trial court's grant of directed verdict in favor of Staley at the conclusion of 
Roundy's case was proper and should be upheld on appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Staley respectfully urges this Court not to disturb the 
jury verdict rendered in this case, and to affirm the judgment of the trial court and its order 
denying Roundy's Motion for New Trial. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this / day of December, 1998. 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER 
& NELSON 
DkUKX 
LYNN S. DAVES 
CHRISTIAN W. NELSON 
Attorneys for Defendant/Respondent 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that eight true and correct copies of the foregoing Brief of 
Appellant was hand delivered to the Court of Appeals and two true and correct copies of the^ 
foregoing Brief of Appellant was mailed, first-class, postage prepaid to counsel, on this [ ~ 
day of December, 1998. 
6016-151P-228355 
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LYNNS. DAVIES [A0824] 
CHRISTIAN W. NELSON [A5771] 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON 
Attorneys for Defendants 
Key Bank Tower, Seventh Floor 
50 So. Main Street 
P.O. Box 2465 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2465 
Telephone: (801)531-2000 
Fax No.: (801)532-5506 
rN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LAINA ROUND Y, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
NEIL STALEY, 
Defendant. 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 940906068 
Judge David S. Young 
The above-captioned action was tried to a jury of eight, the Honorable David S. 
Young presiding, on May 8-9 and May 13-15, 1997. Plaintiff was represented by her attorney 
Peter C. Collins; defendant was represented by his attorney, Lynn S. Davies. At the conclusion 
of the trial, the jury answered and returned a Special Verdict, responding to the questions as 
follows: 
1. Was Defendant, Travis Staley, negligent? 
ANSWER: Yes X No 
t;i« \ 1CC7 
2. Was Travis Staley's negligence a proximate cause of the injuries sustained 
by Plaintiff Laina Roundy9 
ANSWER: Yes X No 
3. Was Plaintiff, Laina Roundy, negligent? 
ANSWER: Yes X No 
4. Was Laina Roundy's negligence a proximate cause of her own injuries? 
ANSWER: Yes X No 
5. Assuming that the total negligence of the parties equals 100%, state the 
percentage of negligence attributed to each party. 
Travis Staley 40 % 
Laina Roundy 60 % 
TOTAL 100% 
The jury was then polled, with all eight jurors affirming that this was in fact their verdict 
as to Questions Nos. 1-4, and seven jurors affirming that this was in fact their verdict as to 
Question No. 5. 
Based on the foregoing findings of the jury, and good cause appearing therefor, the Court 
hereby enters judgment as follows: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that judgment is hereby entered in favor of 
defendant, Travis Staley, no cause of action. The issue of costs is reserved for future 
consideration. 
DATED this i!^ 3 ay of 
Costs $ 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
BUGDEN,«pLLINS & MORTON 
PETER C COLLINS^ 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
n , 1997 THE COURT 
THE HONO 
THIRD DIST 
L. "iizzteT.. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing instrument 
was mailed, first-class, postage prepaid, on this j ^ day of -<V< ili^u , 1997, to the 
following 
John Edward Hansen 
SCALLEY & READING 
261 East 300 South, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
6016-1519 
15369' 
(y^da ^ - ,<JW;u 
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LYNNS. DAVffiS [A0824] 
CHRISTIAN W. NELSON [A5771] 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON 
Attorneys for Defendants 
Key Bank Tower, Seventh Floor 
50 South Main Street 
P.O. Box 2465 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2465 
Telephone: (801)531-2000 
Fax No.: (801)532-5506 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LAINA ROUNDY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
TRAVIS STALEY, 
Defendant. 
ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION 
FOR NEW TRIAL AND ON 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL 
JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING 
THE VERDICT 
Civil No. 940906068 
Judge David S. Young 
Plaintiffs Motion for New Trial and her Motion for Partial Judgment 
Notwithstanding the Verdict came on for hearing on September 5, 1997 before the above 
referenced Court. Plaintiff was represented by her counsel, Peter Collins. Defendant was 
represented by his counsel, Lynn S. Davies. After review of Plaintiffs Motions and the 
supporting memoranda thereto, Defendant's memorandum in opposition thereto, and argument 
presented by the parties, the Court hereby finds that: 
1. Plaintiff fails to cite to any reference in the record to support her claim 
that "irregularities" or "errors of law" occurred during the course of the trial. There was 
sufficient evidence to justify the jury verdict considering the evidence presented at trial. 
2. The Court considers Mr. Ron Gunderson's trial testimony and the related 
surveillance videotape he presented at trial to be evidence which Plaintiff, with ordinary 
prudence, could have learned of and guarded against. Plaintiff could have learned about 
Mr. Gunderson and the evidence he presented by submitting a Motion to Compel discovery from 
Defendant if she was not satisfied with the answers Defendant provided regarding his intended 
trial witnesses. Furthermore, the Court considers Mr. Gunderson and the evidence he presented 
to be evidence in rebuttal to Plaintiffs testimony regarding her physical injuries and damages. 
3. Any error that took place at trial is harmless considering the fact that the 
jury reached its verdict on the basis of liability and the issues raised by Plaintiff in her Motion 
for New Trial and Motion for Partial Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict address her injury 
and damage claims. 
Accordingly, the Court denies Plaintiffs Motion for New Trial and Plaintiffs 
Motion for Partial Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict. 
DATED this / ^ d a y of Am0-&*i&g5? , 1997. 
BY THE COURT: 
The Honorable David S. Young 
Third District Court 
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Approved as to Form: 
BUGDEN, COLLINS & MORTON 
Peter C! Collins 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing instrument 
was mailed, first-class, postage prepaid, on this i'jS) 'day of Qc-A r^Ly^~ 1997, to the 
following: 
Peter C. Collins 
BUGDEN, COLLINS & MORTON 
4021 South 700 East, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
John E. Hansen 
SCALLEY & READING 
261 East 300 South, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
/ / <ncu£r >K • " 
6016-1519 
171094 
*r Ur ^  .^ijry^irt 
3 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROUNDY, LAINA 
ROUNDY, THOR 
-VS-
STALEY, NEIL 
STALEY, TRAVIS 
PLAINTIFF, 
SCHEDULING ORDER AND 
TRIAL NOTICE 
CASE NO. 940906068 CV 
HONORABLE DAVID S. YOUNG 
DEFENDANT. 
PURSUANT TO THE SCHEDULING CONFERENCE HELD ON 1-24-97 
THE FOLLOWING DATES WERE SET AND MATTERS DISCUSSED: 
1. THIS CASE IS SET FOR TRIAL ON MAY 8, 1997 AT 10:00 A.M. 
2. ANTICIPATED TRIAL TIME IS 04 DAYS. 
3. THE CASE IS SET FOR JURY TRIAL. COUNSEL ARE TO 
SUBMIT AN AGREED SET OF JURY INSTRUCTIONS TO THE COURT BY 
. OBJECTED TO INSTRUCTIONS ARE TO BE SUBMITTED 
SEPARATKLY 
4. ALL DISCOVERY INCLUDING RESPONSES MUST BE CONCLUDED BY 
(DISCOVERY CUTOFF 10-31-96) 
5. ALL DISPOSITIVE MOTIONS ARE TO BE HEARD BY 
6. EXHIBIT AND WITNESS LISTS ARE TO BE EXCHANGED BY 
7. A FINAL PRETRIAL SETTLEMENT CONFERENCE WILL BE HELD ON 
APRIL 30, 1997 AT 8:00 A .M. TRIAL COUNSEL AND CLIENTS, OR 
AN INDIVIDUAL WITH AUTHORITY TO SETTLE THIS CASE ARE TO BE 
PRESENT. OUT OF STATE PARTIES MUST BE AVAILABLE BY PHONE AT THE 
TIME OF THE PRETRIAL SETTLEMENT CONFERENCE. 
8. FAILURE TO APPEAR AT THE PRETRIAL SETTLEMENT CONFERENCE 
MAY RESULT IN A DEFAULT. 
9. THE FOREGOING DATES SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FIRM SETTINGS 
AND WILL NOT BE MODIFIED WITHOUT COURT ORDER, AND THEN ONLY 
UPON A SHOWING OF MANIFEST INJUSTICE. COUNSEL ARE INSTRUCTED TO 
STAY IN CONTACT WITH THE CLERK OF THIS COURT AS THE TRIAL DATE 
APPROACHES REGARDING THE TRIAL SETTING. 
11. OTHER MATTERS: 
JUDGMENT IS DENIED 
DATED THIS 24TH DAY OF JANU 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY 
97. 
*fi}jA 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
COPIES MAILED TO PARTIES AT THE ADDRESSES INDICATED ON THE 
ATTACHED MAILING CERTIFICATE. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT I MAILED A TRUE AND CORRECT COPY OF THE 
ATTACHED SCHEDULING ORDER AND TRIAL NOTICE, BY FIRST CLASS MAIL, 
POSTAGE PREPAID, TO THE FOLLOWING: 
COLLINS, PETER Q. 
ATTORNEY FOR DEPENDANT 
4021 SOUTH 700 EAST 
#400 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84107 
DAVIES, LYNN S. 
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF 
50 SOUTH MAIN, #700 
P. O. BOX 2465 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84110 
DATED THIS DAY O 
DEPUTY C: 
